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I
THERE IS VERY LITTLE DISPUTE OVER THE PACTS
GERMANE TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL
Respondents suggest that the entire appeal should be dismissed
because of Plaintiffs' failure to refer to the record with respect
to the statement of facts contained within Appellants' Opening
Brief.

Plaintiffs' counsel apologizes to the Court for the

oversight in not citing the specific record on appeal with respect
to the Statement of Facts contained therein.

However, there is

very little dispute over the facts germane to the issues presented
by this appeal and Plaintiffs are willing to simply accept the
Statement of Facts as presented by the Respondents' Brief with the
exception of paragraph 5 on page 5 of the Respondents' Brief. The
Bouchers observed their son in a comatose state at the hospital
after being advised by a member of the hospital staff that
something was terribly wrong with Danny.

Further, the Bouchers

observed their child awaken from the coma as a severely brain
damaged quadriplegic.

(Record (R.) at 219).

Further, Appellants are not requesting any additional relief
by way of this appeal that has not been previously presented to the
trial court.

Specifically, the request for relief to amend the

complaint to more fully state a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress based on the "direct victim"
status of the appellants was raised before the trial court.

(R.

231) (Reporter's Hearing Transcript of Friday, May 4, 1990, page
19, line 16 - page 20, line 9).

It is a common practice for courts

under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) 6 and the similar
1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) 6 to grant a Motion to
Dismiss With Leave to Amend.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule

15(b); Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d

1452

(Utah 1986); McGavin v.

Preferred Ins. Exch., 7 Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958); Griffen
v. Lack, 286 F.2d 514, (9th Circ. 1961).

II
THE CLAIM OF TORLA AND JAMES BOUCHER FOR
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
IS GENUINE AND SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS BEING
LEGITIMATELY PLED
A.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS WHICH ARE FORESEEABLE AND GENUINE BUT DO NOT FIT
SNUGLY UNDER THE STANDARD OF THE RESTATEMENT "ZONE OF DANGER"
TEST.
For purposes of determining whether or not Torla and James

Boucher are entitled to recover emotional distress damages as a
result of the medical negligence of defendants under a purely
bystander theory Plaintiffs concede that if this Court applies a
strict construction of the Restatement "zone of dcinger" test the
trial court herein correctly

dismissed

the Boucher's claim.

However, this case demonstrates the patent unfairness of applying
such

an

inflexible, mechanistic

test

to

every

circumstance

involving serious foreseeable emotional harm to one other than the
victim of a physical impact. Commentators and jurists including
Justice Durham of this Court are critical of the "2sone of danger"
test as too rigid. In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, Utah (1988)
Justice Durham refers to several law review articles critical of
2

the "zone of danger" standard.

Johnson Id. at 783 and 784.

For

example, in one article appearing in the Indiana Law Review/ "The
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Critical Analysis of
Various Approaches to the Tort In Light of Ochoa v. Superior
Court," 19 Ind.L.Rev. 809 (1986), the author states:
Despite its positive aspects, the rule
(zone of danger) has many draw backs.
The
zone of danger rule is considered to be an
unnecessary,
narrow,
rigid,
and
unjust
limitation on the class of persons who may
recover.
For example, the rule denies
recovery to a mother who sees her child hit by
a car from a distance, yet allows recovery to
a mother who stood a few feet closer to the
accident.
Both mothers would foreseeably
suffer the same emotional injury.
In this
respect, the rule fails to protect worthy
interests.
Thus, limiting recovery by
physical distance is as arbitrary as requiring
a physical impact.
Finally, the courts that have abandoned
the zone of danger approach in favor of more
expansive approaches have not encountered an
increased number of fraudulent claims or a
flood of litigation.
Id. at 814.

(Parenthetical added.)

More importantly, Justice Zimmermann, with the concurrence of
the majority in Johnson makes his reluctance to measure each and
every case of negligent infliction of emotional distress by the
rigid "zone of danger" test known:
I recognize that some of the limitations
inherent in the 'zone of danger1 rule of
section 313 are hard to justify on a purely
theoretical basis.
Indeed, I have serious
concerns about the theoretical rationality of
any limits that can be imposed on liability
X

A copy of the Indiana Law Review article is attached as
Addendum "A" hereto.

3

for
negligent
infliction
of
distress. (Citations omitted.)

emotional

Johnson. Id. at 814.
Further, Justice Zimmermann stated, with the concurrence of
the entire Court:
At some future date, we may determine that
there is merit in some of the other approaches
surveyed in Justice Durham's opinion. However,
until we have had experience with the cause of
action, I conclude that it is best to take the
more conservative approach and adopt the
Restatement rule as written.
Johnson, Id. at 814.
Plaintiffs suggest that this case presents an opportunity for
this Court to take a cautious step forward toward achieving a more
just result as the circumstances herein present than would the
"zone of danger" test permit.
The object here is to fashion an approach that will redress
the emotional harm done to Danny Boucher's parents and others
similarly situated, but limited enough in scope to avoid opening
the flood gates to exaggerated claims.

Many jurisdictions have

grappled with this dilemma, some attempting to distinguish the
"bystander"

from

the

"direct

victims,"

others

making

no

distinction.
The

confusion

is

best

exemplified

by

the

seemingly

contradictory decisions which emanate from the State* of California
during what is commonly referred to as the "post Dillon era."

The

California Second District Court of Appeals in Schwarz v. Regents
of University of California. 276 Cal.Rptr. 470 (Dec. 1990) a case
cited by defendants, recounts this confusion at page 475.
4

California

Supreme

Court

Justice

Eagleson

in

Thing

v.

La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, (1989), 771 P.2d 814 (Apr. 1989) after
conducting an exhaustive review of case law and commentary on the
tort, has fashioned a standard for determining when a plaintiff has
a right of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
which although somewhat arbitrary, provides a fair balance and
reasonable limit to such claims.
We conclude, therefore, that a plaintiff may
recover damages for emotional distress caused
by observing the negligently inflicted injury
of a third person if, but only if, said
plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the
injury victims; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury producing event at the time it
occurs and is then aware that it is causing
injury to the victim; and (3) as a result
suffers serious emotional distress - a
reaction
beyond
that
which
would
be
anticipated in a disinterested witness and
which is not an abnormal response to the
circumstances.
Id. at 830.
James and Torla Boucher suggest that this Court adopt the
Thing standard when measuring "bystander liability" for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.

Such a standard would allow

recovery in this case without opening the flood gates to spurious
claims. Since the California Supreme Court has had vast experience
with the development of the tort and the manner in which it has
been dealt with by the lower Courts, logically this would be an
appropriate Court to turn to for guidance.
The Boucher's claim fits clearly within the limits of the
Thing test.
victim.

As parents, they are closely related to Danny, the

They have suffered distress beyond that expected of a

"disinterested person" and which is certainly not abnormal or
unexpected under the circumstances. Finally, just as the mother in
Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 159, they were present at the
scene, while Danny was in coma, and were painfully aware that the
medical care being provided was causing Danny injury.
The

requirement

of

a

contemporaneous

incident has been liberally construed.

perception

of

the

City of Austin v. Davis,

(Tex.App. 1985), 639 S.W.2d 31, 33 (a father "intensely involved in
search and subsequent discovery of his son" at the bottom of an air
shaft, satisfied the contemporaneous observation requirements of
the "bystander" doctrine); Champion v. Gray, (Fla. 1985) 478 So.2d
17 (mother seeing daughter's body at the scene of an accident,
collapsed

and

died

on the

spot

satisfied

the

contemporaneous

observation requirement); Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkin,
(Alaska 1986) 727 P.2d 1038, (parents arrived on the scene shortly
after an accident and observed their dying daughter being dragged
by

the

hair

from

a

wrecked

auto,

held

to

satisfy

the

contemporaneous observation requirement).
The circumstances of this case are very similar to the facts
of Ochoa, supra, previously cited in the Boucher's opening brief at
page 29 and reviewed at length by the California Supreme Court in
Thing.

In Ochoa, a 13-year-old boy, while in the custody of the

Santa Clara Juvenile Hall, became ill.

His mother visited him on

two occasions and was very distressed at what she perceived to be
inadequate medical attention.

Her son later died of complications

associated with pneumonia. The California Supreme Court, held that
6
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is required to recognize that defendant's conduct somehow caused
Danny's injuries•
Therefore, the Bouchers urge this Court to adopt the Thing
standard from a jurisdiction that has already experienced the
"kinks" in the tort.

The "zone of danger" test is an unfair and

antiquated standard, that, more often than not, will lead to an
unjust result.

B.

NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE BOUCHERS OUGHT TO BE ENTITLED TO
RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 19EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
BASED ON AN ENLIGHTENED "BYSTANDER THEORY OF RECOVERY, THE
BOUCHERS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER SUCH DAMAGES PREMISED ON A
"DIRECT VICTIM" LIABILITY BASIS,
As previously argued at length in the opening brief, the

Bouchers are entitled to recover as "direct victims" under a
contract or foreseeability theory.

In response, defendants rely

upon Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic Inc., 48
Cal. 583, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989) and Schwarz v. Regents of the
University of California, 276 Cal.Rptr. 470 (Cal.App.2d Dist. 1990)
to suggest to this Court that the Bouchers are not "direct victims"
of the medical negligence performed upon their son Danny.
No one disputes the findings of the Court in Marlene F. The
mothers were patients as well as "direct victims" of the breach of
the psychotherapist-patient relationship.

In Marlcme F. however,

the Court did not exclude from the "direct victim" status all who
were not patients

of the physician

providers.
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Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital. 27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,
167 Cal.Rptr. 831 (1980), Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal.App.3d
600, 208 Cal.Rptr. 899
Cal.App.3d

(1984), Newton v. Kaiser Hospital. 184

386, 228 Cal.Rptr. 890

(1986), Accounts Adi ustment

Bureau v. Cooperman, 158 Cal.App.3d 844, 204 Cal.Rptr. 881 (1984),
Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal.App.3d

108, 181 Cal.Rptr. 12

(1982),

Ouesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal.App.3d 596,
Cal. Rptr.

(Aug. 1989), all of which have been cited

in

Appellants' Opening Brief under Section VII (A).
Ill
THE RIGHT OF THE BOUCHERS TO RECOVER FOR
LOSS OF FILIAL CONSORTIUM RESULTING FROM
SEVERE INJURIES TO THEIR ADULT CHILD IS
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH COMMON LAW
Defendants suggest that the loss of filial consortium is a
non-recoverable damage in the State of Utah and rely principally
upon the case of Hackford v. Utah Power and Light Company, 740 P.2d
1281 (Utah 1987).

As plaintiffs have argued repeatedly, reliance

on the Hackford decision is totally and completely misplaced in
attempting to determine the right of the parents in this case to
recover for loss of filial consortium as a result of severe and
permanent injuries to their adult child.
The issue presented in Hackford was whether or not the Married
Woman's Act, Rev. Stat, of Utah 1989, Section 1198 - 1207, now
found at Utah Code Ann. . Section 30-2-1 - 10 (1984) , abolished the
common law right of a husband to recover loss of consortium for
death or injury to his wife.

Justice Zimmermann, after reviewing

previous interpretations of the Married Woman's Act found in Black
10
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The

only

question

presented

by

this

case which

has not

apparently been answered by the Utah Courts and/or Legislature is
whether or not the parents of a severely injured adult child may
recover for loss of filial consortium.
Justice Durham, in her dissenting opinion in Hackford points
out that Utah has long permitted parental recovery for the loss of
society, love, and companionship in cases where the claim arises
out of wrongful death citing Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108
(Utah 1982), Hackford Id. at 1293.

The Utah Supreme Court has

reiterated this view taken in Jones in Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109
Utah 146, 159, 160 (1946).
Utah 139

Further, in Beaman v. Mining Co., 23

(1900) the Utah Supreme Court adopted the view that

recovery for loss of filial consortium was not limited to the age
of minority but such right extends beyond the age of minority.
Plaintiffs have not uncovered a case in the State of Utah
wherein the Courts have addressed the specific issue presented
herein, that is, the right of the parents to recover for loss of
filial consortium for severe injuries sustained by their adult
child.

However, Justice Durham in her dissenting opinion to the

Hackford decision suggests, at least implicitly, that there should
be no distinction

between

a deceased

versus

incapacitated

severely injured member of the consortium relationship.
Id. at 1293 - 1294.

or

Hackford.

Interestingly enough, Justice Durham cites an

2

A copy is attached as Addendum "B."
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In Frank. the Arizona Supreme Court, En Banc, agreed with
Reben and concluded that:
Often death is separated from severe injury by
mere fortuity; and it would be anomalous to
distinguish between the two when the quality
of consortium is negatively affected by both.
Frank, Id. at 957.
Quoting from an article in the Arizona State Journal, "The
Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting From
the Negligent Injury to a Child: A Proposal for Arizona," 1980
Ariz. St.L.J. 909, 923 the Court in Frank states:
'It is easy to see that the loss of a child
through his death takes from his parents the
society and companionship that is the essence
of the lost relationship.
But consider the
magnitude
of the
loss of
society
and
companionship that occurs when a normal
[child] is suddenly reduced to a blind, nearly
deaf, partially paralyzed child with a mental
age of three. The parental expectations for
the continuation of the family relationship
are the same in either case. That the parents
still have their son to love and care for is a
factor to consider in determining the extent
of their loss, but does not negate the loss.
They have sustained a genuine loss in the
nature of the society and companionship they
can anticipate receiving from their son as a
consequence of his injuries.•
Finally, the Frank Court, after conducting an exhaustive study
of the origin and/or right of loss of consortium and its heritage
concluded that
Therefore, to suggest as a matter of law that
compensable consortium begins at birth and
ends at age eighteen is illogical and
inconsistent with common sense and experience.
Human relationships cannot and should not be
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IV
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Appellants respectfully request that
this Court reverse the dismissal of the trial Court.

LAW OFFICES OF IRWIN M. ZALKIN
DATED

. 4/si hi

Byn
Irwin M. zalkin
Attorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM "7\

The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Critical
Analysis of Various Approaches to the Tort in Light of
Ochoa v. Superior Court
L

INTRODUCTION

The negligent infliction of emotional distress is a tort that has evolved
rapidly since 1968.! This rapid evolution has caused courts to analyze
and apply the concept in vastly different ways. Four general approaches
have emerged out of the chaos — the impact rule, the zone of danger
approach, the pure foreseeability approach, and the Dillon test. The
advantages and disadvantages of each of these views have been the
subject of much debate.2 To date, the "best" approach appears to be
an unanswered question.
California broke new ground in this area of the law. In Dillon v.
LeggS the California Supreme Court created a three-prong foreseeability
test as a guideline for determining a defendant's duty to a bystander
who witnesses the death or injury of a loved one.4 Although the Dillon
approach has been generally well received, it has also provoked some
valid criticisms.5

•W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW

or TORTS § 54 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter ated as PROSSER & KEETON). The negligent

infliction of emotional distress has been defined as "a tort against the integrity of the
family unit." Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983). "The existence
of a marital or intimate familial relationship is the nucleus of the personal interest to be
protected." Id.
2
See, e.g., Maragos, Negiigent Infliction of Emotional Distress — Mixed Signals?,
% WEST ST. U.L. REV. 139 (1981); Nolan and Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Coherence Emerging From Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1981-82); Pearson,
Lability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm — A Comment on the
Nature of Arbttrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982); Note, Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals: California Expands Liability for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Distress, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 291 (1981-82); Comment, Bystander Recovery for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Iowa: Implementing an Optimal Balance, 67 IOWA L.
REV. 333 (1981-82); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Absent Physical
Impact or Subsequent Physical Injury, 47 Mo. L. REV. 124 (1982); Comment, Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in New Jersey: Compensating the Foreseeable Plaintiff,
32 RUTGERS L. REV. 796 (1979); Note, Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress
Permitted to Mother Who Witnessed the Violent Death of Her Child Even Though the
Mother was Outside Zone of Danger, 25 Vnx. L. REV. 195 (1979-80).
*8 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
'Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
'See, e.g., D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 665, 338 A.2d 524, 535 (1975)
(Joslin, J., dissenting) {Dillon approach provides no rational way to limit liability); see
cbo infra text accompanying notes 126-55.
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Recently, the California Supreme Court was given an opportunity
to clarify the application of the Dillon test in a factually distinguishable
case and thereby eliminate the criticisms of Dillon. In Ochoa v. Superior
Court * the court declined this opportunity. The Ochoa court ignored
the unsettled debate as to the best approach in mental distress cases
and the conflict in its own case law. It limited its holding to the facts
of the case and added a few variations to prior case law.7 The result
was the addition of another conflicting mental distress case to a collection
of discordant case law.
This Note will survey the benefits and criticisms of each of the four
approaches to the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Next,
this Note will review the cases that have followed Dillon and elucidate
the inconsistencies in the case law. The Ochoa case will also be analyzed
with respect to its inconsistencies with prior Dillon progeny, its internal
reasoning, and its effect upon future mental distress law in Dillon
jurisdictions and in jurisdictions that use other approaches. Finally, this
Note will propose a more just and equitable solution: a flexible and
relaxed standard for liability coupled with an increased burden of proof
for recovery.
II.

VARIOUS APPROACHES TO NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS TO COMMON PROBLEMS

The courts have used four vastly different approaches to the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress: the impact rule, the zone
of danger rule, the pure foreseeability approach, and the Dillon foreseeability test. Each approach merits a discussion of its advantages and
disadvantages.
A.

The Impact Rule

The impact rule was the original, and most limiting, of all the mental
distress approaches.8 The jurisdictions that follow this rule allow no
cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress unless the
plaintiff suffers a contemporaneous physical impact.9 Accordingly, a
bystander who witnesses an injury to another cannot recover for his
mental distress absent a physical impact.10

*39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
7d. at 170-72, 703 P.2d at 8-9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69.
"PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at § 54.

*£.g., Estate of Harper 9 . Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Hariccom v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 104 111. App. 3d 780,
433 N.E.2d 291 (1982); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walters, 466 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984); Merluzzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 409, 610 P.2d 739 (1980).
"»£.£., Harkcom. 104 ill. App. 3d 780, 433 N.E.2d 291.
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Several rationales have been advanced in favor of the impact rule.
First and foremost, the physical impact rule allows certainty of liability.M
The defendant may be found liable for the plaintiffs mental distress
only if he caused a physical impact upon the plaintiff. Because the
impact rule provides simplicity and consistency to the question of liability,
some courts have continued to use it, even though its other benefits are
doubtful.12
The impact rule satisfied the courts' general distrust of emotional
distress claims.13 First, the courts thought the impact rule prevented
speculative damage awards.14 Limiting liability to cases involving impact
was thought to limit recovery to situations where the emotional injury
could be substantiated.15 Actual mental injury was thought to be more
probable when the plaintiff suffered a physical impact than when he
did not.16 Therefore, the impact rule validated emotional distress awards
by restricting them to cases where actual mental injury was most probable.
Even if medical science could establish mental injury to a reasonable
degree of certainty, advocates of the impact rule argued that causation
of those damages would be difficult to prove absent impact.17 Even if
the mental damage could be established, there was no proof that the
defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the injury in question.18
Thus, physical impact was required to prove causation.19
By substantiating the injury and causation elements of the cause of
action, the impact rule reduced the potential for fraudulent claims.20
The argument was that if one could not establish mental injury or
causation to any degree of medical certainty, then the potential for
fraudulent claims would increase.21 Thus, as impact substantiated both
mental injury and causation, it decreased the opportunity for fraud.
Moreover, the impact rule prevented potential theoretical problems.
First, the courts were fearful of a flood of litigation over trivial claims
if the impact restriction were removed.22 A physical impact limited

11

See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 363-64.
'-The impact rule originally provided causation and proof of damages when medical
science could not. Today, the medical field has made great advances in the areas of
psychiatry and mental illness, and such proof is no longer needed. Towns v. Anderson,
195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978).
"PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 363.

"Towns, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163.
"Id.
"Id.
,7
See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
"See id.
"See id.
*See Towns, 195 Colo, at 519. 579 P.2d at 1164,
"See id.
-See Sinn, 486 Pa. at 162, 404 A.2d at 680.
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litigation to cases deserving recovery.23 Second, once the impact restriction
was removed, liability would be greatly extended and difficult to limit
at any stage.24 The courts feared the lack of a rational basis for limiting
liability.25 Thus, absent the impact requirement, it was thought that the
courts would eventually be forced to recognize a cause of action for
mental distress under any circumstances.26 Finally, the elimination of the
impact rule was thought to impose a new duty upon the defendant.27
A new duty created a new cause of action.2* Therefore, judicial conservatism favored the retention of the impact rule.29
Although the impact rule was initially a majority approach to the
negligent infliction of emotional distress, it has fallen into disfavor in
recent years.30 Many of the rule's rationales have become outmoded.
The most important reason for the decline of the impact rule was
the advance in medical science in the area of mental ailments.31 Psychiatry
can now prove injury and causation to some degree.32 Thus, the potential
for fraudulent claims, absent impact, is reduced.33
Furthermore, the flood of litigation argument has been rejected as
a valid reason for requiring physical impact.34 A court's caseload is, by
itself, an unacceptable reason for denying recovery where it is deserved.33
In fact, those courts that have abandoned the impact rule have not
encountered an increase in this type of litigation.36
Finally, the impact rule has been criticized as arbitrary, capricious,
and inequitable.37 Requiring impact denies deserving plaintiffs a recovery
for a sometimes debilitating injury.3* An emotional injury can be as
devasting to one's health as a physical injury39 and therefore also deserves
"PROSSER & KEETON, supra note I, § 54 at 363.

Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554.
558 (1969).

*Id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
*/rf. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423. 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
*See. e.*., Towns, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
1, at § 54.
"See, e.g., Culbcrt v. Sampson's Supermarket. 444 A.2d 433, 435 (Me. 1982).
"See. e.*., Sinn, 436 Pa. at 158, 404 A.2d at 678.
"Id.
u
Id. at 162-63, 404 A.2d at 680-81.
"Id. at 163, 404 A.2d at 681; see also Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939).
"See Sinn, 486 Pa. at 162 n.12, 404 A.2d at 680 n.12.
"£.*., Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
M
See Estate of Harper v. Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
"See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babincau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (mother
died from shock of witnessing daughter being hit by car).
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compensation. The rule is arbitrary because it has been used as a legal
fiction.40 For example, smoke, dust, trivial burns, or jolts may supply
the impact necessary for recovery.41 Because claims of pain and suffering
in physical injury suits may be fraudulent or exaggerated, the argument
that physical impact in emotional distress suits reduces fraud is unfounded.42 These serious criticisms of the impact rule have led many
courts to abandon it in favor of one of the newer approaches.
B.

Zone of Danger

The zone of danger rule is succinctly stated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Section 313 provides:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to
another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness
or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by
knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the
distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily
harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to
illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional
distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person,
unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.41
In other words, the actor will not be found liable for a bystander's
emotional distress unless: (1) the actor's conduct was negligent; (2) it
was foreseeable that the bystander would suffer distress; and (3) the
bystander was within the zone of danger created by the defendant's
conduct.44 Many states follow this zone of danger approach.45
The zone of danger rule has several advantages. First, the zone of
danger determination is objective and can be readily and consistently

•PHOSSE* & KEETON, supra note I, $ 54 at 363.

"Id. at 363-64.
*See. e.g., Schuitz v. Barberton Glass Co.. 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109
(1983).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 313 (1965) (emphasis added).

~ld.
"Eg., Keck v. Jackson. 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (en banc); Towns, 195
Colo. 517. 579 P.2d 1163; Scadier v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980); Vaiilancourt
v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc.. 139 Vt. 131. 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Waul* v.
Warrington. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
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applied.46 The zone of danger rule permits a simple determination of
which persons may recover.47
Second, the defendant's liability is based to some degree upon his
reasonable expectations of what injury could result from his conduct.4*
If the defendant injures a small child, he should expect a parent to be
nearby and to suffer severe mental distress from realization of the child's
injury.49 Although this rationale does not apply in every situation, it
does give some legitimacy to the rule.50
Finally, the courts have used some of the same rationales for the
zone of danger rule that supported the impact rule. The zone of danger
approach limits liability by limiting the class of persons who may recover.31 Thus, the rule arguably prevents a flood of litigation.
Despite its positive aspects, the rule has many drawbacks. The zone
of danger rule is considered to be an unnecessary, narrow, rigid, and
unjust limitation on the class of persons who may recover.52 For example,
the rule denies recovery to a mother who sees her child hit by a car
from a distance, yet allows recovery to a mother who stood a few feet
closer to the accident.53 Both mothers would foreseeably suffer the same
emotional injury. In this respect, the rule fails to protect worthy interests.34 Thus, limiting recovery by physical distance is as arbitrary as
requiring a physical impact.55
Finally, the courts that have abandoned the zone of danger approach
in favor of more expansive approaches have not encountered an increased
number of fraudulent claims56 or a flood of litigation.57
C.

Pure Foreseeability

Two jurisdictions have adopted a new approach to the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Both Ohio58 and Hawaii59 have expanded

"E.g., Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 554.
"Dziokonski, 375 Mass. at 564, 380 N.E.2d at 1300.
"See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 366.
"Id.

"•For example, a wife who witnesses a husband's injury could reasonably suffer
severe mental distress yet not be a foreseeable witness to the defendant.
"See Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, 444 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1982).
'•Id.
"In Dillon, the trial court dismissed the mother's claim based on the zone of danger
rule because the mother witnessed the accident from a few feet further than the victim's
lister, who was allowed to proceed with her daim. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 732, 441 P.2d
at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
"£.*., Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979).
M
Sw#i, 486 Pa. at 157, 404 A.2d at 677-78.
"See id. at 162 n.12, 404 A.2d at 680 n.12.
%

'See id.

*Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983).
^Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
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liability on a "pure foreseeability" basis. Where serious emotional distress
to a plaintiff-bystander is the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's negligent act, liability is imposed based on the application
of general tort principles.60
Many of the previous restrictions upon liability are absent in the
"pure foreseeability'' approach. The plaintiffs recovery is not limited
to situations where the defendant actually causes injury or death to
another.61 The defendant's act need not result in physical harm to the
victim.62 In addition, the plaintiff has a cause of action for emotional
distress for negligent damage to his personal63 or real64 property. Moreover, if the bystander's emotional distress is serious, physical harm is
not required.65 Without the requirements of actual physical harm to a
third person or resulting physical injury to the plaintiff from his distress,
the pure foreseeability approach allows recovery in a broad range of
circumstances.66
The pure foreseeability approach has one additional advantage over
previous approaches. It defines the tort in a manner that conforms to
other aspects of negligence law67 by basing duty on foreseeability principles.6* In addition, the plaintiff must prove a breach of duty, causation,
and harm.69 The only limitation imposed upon recovery, other than the
usual negligence constraints, is that the distress must be serious,70 which
is determined objectively.71 Once the objective threshold is met, the
plaintiff may recover for any distress actually suffered.72
The scope of recoverable damages also conforms to other aspects
of tort law.73 If the defendant had caused a bodily injury to the plaintiff,
he would be liable for pain and suffering.74 Therefore, if he causes a

"Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156. 174. 472 P.2d 509. 520 (1970).
"Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 80. 451 N.E.2d at 767.
"Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557. 632 P.2d 1066 (1981)
(recovery for mental distress due to death of family dog).
"Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii 156. 472 P.2d 509 (recovery for mental distress due to
negligent damage to house).
"See id. Emotional distress is serious when "a reasonable man, normally constituted,
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances
of the case." Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
*See. e.g., Campbell, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (distress from death of dog);
Leong, 55 Hawaii at 398. 520 P.2d at 758 (distress from seeing step-grandmother killed);
Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (distress from damage to home).
"See, e.g., Leong, 55 Hawaii at 408, 520 P.2d at 764-65.
"Id.
-Id at 407. 520 P.2d at 764.
"Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 172-73, 472 P.2d at 520.
u
See supra note 65.
^In tort law, the plaintiff may recover for any injury actually suffered under the
"Eggshell Skull" theory. PKOSSE* & KEETOM, supra note !, § 43 at 291-92.
n
See Leong, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758.
u
See Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 75. 451 N.E.2d at 763.
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mental injury, regardless of the source of the distress, he should be
liable for the pain and suffering or distress that such an injury involves.73
Despite these advantages, the courts have struggled to utilize the
pure foreseeability theory without extending liability beyond what would
be expected.76 The greatest difficulty with the pure foreseeability approach
is the determination of the defendant's duty. While all courts that have
used this approach agree that foreseeability is the basis of duty, the
courts are in conflict as to what must be foreseeable to impose that
duty.
One view is that duty is based upon a foreseeable injury.77 The
plaintiff may recover if his mental distress was reasonably foreseeable.71
This approach is too broad. Many of life's events cause reasonably
foreseeable mental distress. For example, rejection of a child by his
social peers may cause foreseeable distress to the child's parents. Likewise,
a car accident that killed a distant relative to the plaintiff could foreseeably cause mental distress. Thus, this broad test of foreseeable injury
imposes a duty in situations that the law may not deem worthy of
compensation.
Another approach to duty used under the pure foreseeability rule
is the foreseeable plaintiff.79 The defendant's duty is limited to the risks
of his negligent act.80 The defendant owes a duty only to those plaintiffs
who are foreseeably endangered by the risks that made the conduct
unreasonably dangerous.81 Despite this limitation upon duty, the courts
have struggled with liability beyond that which the defendant could or
should expect.82 For example, the defendant could be liable for emotional
distress of the victim's entire family because they are foreseeable plaintiffs.83 Thus, despite the objective that emotional distress should conform
to other aspects of negligence law, the courts began to impose arbitrary
restrictions, such as distance, upon duty.84 Limiting liability by geographical distance between the event and the plaintiff creates the same
problems as the zone of danger approach.83

7

7<*. at 77, 451 N.E.2d at 765.
*See, e.g.. Kclley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975)
(plaintiff must be located within reasonable distance from accident in "pure foreseeability"
cases even though physical distance should not alone bar recovery).
"See Leong, 55 Hawaii at 408, 520 P.2d at 764-65.
"See Rodngues, 52 Hawaii at 174, 472 P.2d at 521.
m
Id.
"Id.
c
See Kelley, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673.
"Before Keliey was decided, any "foreseeable" plaintiff could have recovered. See
Rodngues, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509.
"See Keliey, 56 Hawaii at 209, 532 P.2d at 676,
"See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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The extension of duty to mental distress caused by injury to property
has also been a source of controversy. Recovery for emotional distress
caused by property loss promotes materialism.86 Furthermore, a plaintiff
who is economically compensated for property loss should not objectively
suffer severe emotional distress. In other words, the defendant would
not expect that an economically compensated loss would cause severe
emotional distress. While there may be some basis for emotional distress
when the defendant destroys unique and irreplaceable property, the courts
have not specifically limited duty in this manner.87 Thus, under this
approach, a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress resulting from
damage to his car, boat, or clothes. Although an individual could
foreseeably develop an emotional attachment to these items, the defendant
has no reasonable expectation of liability. Until these theoretical conflicts
are settled, most courts will probably not follow the pure foreseeability
approach.
D.

The Dillon Approach

The final approach to the negligent infliction of emotional distress
is that espoused in Dillon v. Legg.** Dillon was a classic example of
the problems associated with the zone of danger approach. A child was
negligently struck and killed by the defendant automobile driver. Both
the victim's mother and sister suffered severe emotional distress from
observing the accident. Because the sister had been standing a few feet
closer to the victim, she was within the zone of danger, while the mother
was not. Therefore, the trial court dismissed the mother's claim. On
review of the dismissal, the California Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff should recover if the defendant should foresee fright or shock
severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person "normally constituted."89
The California court carefully delineated guidelines for the determination of the defendant's duty. These guidelines are: 1) "Whether
plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with
one who was a distance away from it;"90 2) "Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning
of the accident from others after its occurrence;"9* and 3) "Whether

"*£$.. Rodngues, 52 Hawaii at 178-79, 472 P.2d at 522-23 (Levinson, J., concurring
and dissenting).
"See, e.g., id. Rodriguez dealt with the negligent flooding of plaintiffs home. There
is no indication that such a decision would not be extended to other property items.
-68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 CaJ. Rptr. 72 (1968).
"Id, at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 C3l. Rptr. at 80.
m

!d.
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plaintiff and the victim [are] closely related, as contrasted with an absence
of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship."92
The court rioted that while the defendant's duty could not be predetermined in every instance, that duty should be based upon the degree
of foreseeability;93 the case should be governed by general rules of tort
law, including the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability.94
Many courts follow the Dillon approach.95 Dillon discards arbitrary
limitations on the defendant's duty in favor of a more rational foreseeability approach.96 The imposition of duty by the foreseeability factors
set forth in Dillon comports with public policy.97 Public policy demands
a remedy for one who suffers a wrong.98 Courts have considered that
this method does not drastically increase the defendant's burden, as the
departure from prior law is only in the scope of recognizable damages
flowing from the negligent conduct.99
The Dillon foreseeability test is a middle-of-the-road approach. It
recognizes the benefits of using foreseeability to determine duty, yet
limits the duty where pure foreseeability cannot. It balances the need
for flexible plaintiff recovery against the hardship of unlimited liability
for the defendant. The Dillon standard incorporates the foreseeable
plaintiff test with the foreseeable mental injury test.'00 Despite the theoretical soundness of such an approach, however, California courts have
struggled with its application in non-conventional situations.
III.

THE CALIFORNIA CONFLICT — THE AFTERMATH

OF Dillon AND THE Ochoa DECISION
Dillon became the basis for an entire line of mental distress cases.
These cases culminated in the recent case of Ochoa v. Superior Court.m

"id.
"Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
m
Id. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
"See, e.g., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164. 326 A.2d 129
(1973); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets,
Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Daokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978); Miller v. Cook, 87 Mich. App. 6, 273 N.W.2d 567 (1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119
N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980);
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
404 A.2d 672 (1979); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982).
«\See. e.g., Culbert, 444 A.2d at 437.
"See Sinn, 486 Pa. at 161-67, 404 A.2d at 680-83.
m
See id. at 167, 404 A.2d at 683.
"Id.
"«See Di/lon, 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
'"•39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1. 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
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In Ochoa, the court changed Dillon appreciably without answering the
questions raised by the Dillon progeny or by the debate as to which
mental distress theory is best.
A.

The Ochoa Decision

The Ochoa case dealt with the death of a thirteen-year-old boy. The
child was being held in a juvenile hall when he became severely ill with
bilateral pneumonia. The defendant doctor misdiagnosed the child as
having influenza. He visited the child twice in two days, despite repeated
communications by the plaintiff-mother that further treatment was needed.
Mrs. Ochoa visited her son and found him extremely ill and in severe
pain. Despite Mrs. Ochoa's pleas, no x-rays, blood tests, or urine tests
were performed. She was denied the opportunity to take her child to
their family physician. Mrs. Ochoa visited her son several times, but
was not present when he died. Her husband, also a plaintiff in the suit,
visited the child once while he was ill. The child died three days after
the onset of his illness.
In addition to suing on several other grounds, Mr. and Mrs. Ochoa
sued for their mental distress caused by the doctor's negligence in
mistreating their son. The trial court dismissed their claim for negligent
infliction of mental distress.'02 The plaintiffs then sought a writ of
mandate to compel the trial court to reinstate several causes of action,
including their mental distress claim.103 The California Supreme Court
held that both plaintiffs had a cause of action for the distress they
suffered as a result of their observation of the defendant's conduct, the
child's injury, and their contemporaneous awareness that the defendant's
conduct or lack thereof was causing injury to the child.104 Furthermore,
the court held that the injury to the victim need not be caused by a
sudden occurrence.105 Requiring the injury to be sudden arbitrarily limits
liability when the shock to the plaintiff is highly foreseeable, especially
when the shock flows from an abnormal event.106
B.

The Dillon Progeny: Cases and Conflicts

To understand the import of Ochoa, the Dillon progeny must be
analyzed. In the decisions following Dillon, three main areas of conflict
have arisen. The first area of controversy involves the definition of
"contemporaneous" in the second portion of the Dillon foreseeability

m

ld, at 164, 703 P.2d at 4. 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664.

""/dL at 170, 703 P 2d at 8t 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
ld. at 168. 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cai. Rptr. at 667.

m
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test. The guideline requires a contemporaneous perception of the injuryproducing event.107 In cases in which the plaintiff gains knowledge of
the victim's injury well after its occurrence, the courts consistently hold
the plaintiff has no cause of action for mental distress.108
When the plaintiff sees the injury immediately after it was inflicted,
however, the courts are split as to whether the observation is "contemporaneous" with the injury-producing event. In Archibald v. Braverman,*w a mother heard an explosion and rushed to the scene to find
her son had suffered traumatic amputation of his hand. The court held
that her shock was contemporaneous with the explosion, even though
she did not observe the event.M0 Other cases have stretched either facts
or reasoning to find that the plaintiffs observation of the injury was
contemporaneous. In Krouse v. Grahm"x the plaintiff was sitting in his
car when the defendant struck both the car and the plaintiffs wife.
The plaintiff did not sec the impact. The court held that the husband
did "contemporaneously observe" the incident because he was a percipient witness to the impact, knew his wife's position beforehand, saw
the defendant approaching, and must have realized the car struck her.112
The court apparently used "constructive knowledge" to find a "contemporaneous" observation of the event.
In Nazaroff v. Superior Court J" the court stretched the facts to
find a contemporaneous observation of the injury-producing event. In
Nazaroff, a child drowned in a swimming pool. His mother, alerted by
a neighbor's cry, arrived on the scene in time to see the boy's body
pulled from the pool. The court held that the mother had contemporaneously observed the drowning because drowning is not an instantaneous
event, but a continuous process of reduction of blood-gas levels."4
In contrast, other California courts have interpreted the contemporaneous requirement strictly. In Parsons v. Superior Court,ui the
plaintiffs were following their daughters in a car when the defendant
driver of the daughters' car rounded a curve and crashed. The parents
did not see the accident, but arrived on the scene "before the dust had

•m0///o/?, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
See, e.g., Madigan v. City of Santa Ana, 145 Cal. App. 3d 607, 193 Cal. Rptr.
593 (1983) (parents did not have a cause of action for mental distress because they did
not arrive at the scene of their son's auto accident until 15 minutes after its occurrence).
'"•275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
%w
ld. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
'"19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
ni
ld. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
M,
80 Cal. App. 3d 553. 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
"4!d. at 566-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
•"81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
im
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settled.'* The court held the plaintiffs did not have a contemporaneous
observation of the injury-producing event and dismissed the suit.1'6
Similarly, in Hathaway v. Superior Court,117 a child was electrocuted
on an outdoor cooler. The parents, who were indoors, were alerted by
the child's friends. They ran outside to find their son lying in a pool
of water, gagging and spitting. The child did not die until later. Evidence
introduced at trial suggested that electrocution is not an instantaneous
event, but a process that may require time. Despite this evidence, the
court held that the parents did not contemporaneously observe the event
because the child was no longer touching the cooling unit when they
arrived.,l8 This strict interpretation of "contemporaneous observation"
directly contradicts the holdings of Archibald and Nazaroff.
The second area of conflict in the application of the Dillon test is
the definition of sensory perception. Perception of the event, other than
by sight, has been difficult to define consistently. For example, a mother
who witnesses the defendant's act and her child's injury has been held
to perceive the event although she was unaware of the negligence at
that time.119 Yet, if the plaintiff directly perceives the negligence and
not the injury, he has not sensorily perceived the injury-producing event.120
Furthermore, courts have included the sense of touch as a sensory
perception of the event. A mother in labor who felt her contractions
cease and her baby nod its head was held to have a sensory perception
of the death of the fetus.121 It is difficult to imagine that this was
actually a sensory perception of death. It is unlikely the mother actually
gained direct knowledge at that moment that the fetus was injured.
Thus, it appears that the court has stretched the concept of sensory
perception to include perception of an event that does not include
contemporaneous knowledge of the injury. Therefore, the definition of
sensory perception needs to be clarified.
The third area of conflict developed in the reasoning of the "direct
victim" approach used in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.172 In
that case, the defendant-doctor negligently misdiagnosed the plaintiffs
wife as having syphilis. The doctor advised the wife to have her husband
undergo treatment. The stress and suspicion of sexual infidelity caused
the marriage to dissolve. The court held that the plaintiff-husband was

"•/</. ac 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
•"112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
"*/</. at 736. 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
»"S« Mobaldi v. Board of Regents. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573. 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
•^Justus v. Atchison. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122. 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
'"Johnson v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1007, J77 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65
(1981).
,22
27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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a direct victim of the defendant's negligent act.123 The court stated that
the Molien facts were distinguishable from the Dillon scenario.124 Under
Molien, the plaintiff has a cause of action without proof of physical
injury resulting from his distress.123 The court noted that the physical
injury requirement is an arbitrary and artificial limit on recovery.126 The
physical injury requirement allows recovery when distress is trivial and
denies it in cases where recovery is deserved.127
Shortly thereafter, another case embellished the direct victim theory.
In Andalon v. Superior Court,12* parents sued for the wrongful birth
of a child with Down's syndrome. The court stated that the parents
had a cause of action under the direct victim theory even though they
had not witnessed the gene mutation considered to be the "injuryproducing event.",29 Thus, under a direct victim analysis, plaintiffs need
not prove sensory perception of the injury-producing event.
The lack of both a physical injury requirement and a sensory perception requirement conflicts with cases following Dillon. Yet there
appears to be little rational basis for the different standard used under
the Molien analysis. A "direct victim" is not more likely to have suffered
mental distress than a bystander in a Dillon situation. Therefore, there
is no reason to require physical injury or contemporaneous awareness
under the Dillon approach and not under the Molien approach. If the
likelihood of distress experienced by the direct victim is equal to that
of the Dillon bystander, then the bystander should be allowed to recover,
despite the lack of physical injury or contemporaneous sensory perception.
C.

Ochoa's Effect on Prior Case Law

Ochoa presented an ideal opportunity to clarify and redefine these
three inconsistencies in the case law of mental distress. Instead, the
California Supreme Court sidestepped the issues.
The Ochoa court ignored the "contemporaneous" issue by holding
that an observation of the defendant's conduct and of the child's injury
and a contemporaneous awareness of the cause of the injury were
sufficient.130 The court did not address whether the observation of the
act and the injury must be contemporaneous or what "contemporaneous"
means. The court merely required that the plaintiff have a contempor-

™ld. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
"Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
'*/</.
"Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
,=w
162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984).
,2
V</. at 605, 208 Cal. Rptr at 901.
""39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
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aneous knowledge of the source of the injury. The court did not clarify
whether the plaintiff must know of the source of the injury at the time
the injury is being inflicted. In Ochoa, the negligent conduct was allowing
the victim's pneumonia to continue untreated. It is unlikely that the
mother became aware that the defendant's failure to treat the child was
the source of the child's injury while she observed his suffering. It is
more likely that she recognized the cause of the injury subsequent to
her realization of an injury. The court's requirement of a "contemporaneous awareness" of the cause of the injury is, therefore, unclear.
The Ochoa court also avoided defining "sensory perception of the
injury-producing event." In Ochoa, the injury-producing event was the
negligence of the doctor. It is unclear whether the plaintiff-parents
actually witnessed his negligence. The doctor's negligence was his failure
to treat his patient. It is unlikely that the mother actually witnessed this
non-treatment. It is more likely that she became aware of it through
her observations that the child did not become well. It may be argued
that this is a sensory observation of only the injury and not the event.
Thus, this case does not clarify what is required for sensory perception
of the injury-producing event.
Finally, Ochoa deals directly with the third area of conflict — the
inconsistencies between Dillon and Molien. Ochoa held that the plaintiffs
did not have a cause of action under the Molien direct victim analysis,
as the negligence of the doctor was directed at the boy, not the parents.'3I
If the doctor's negligence was a lack of attention, then certainly he
ignored the mother's attempt to get medical attention. If he ignored the
son, he ignored the mother. Furthermore, the court overlooked the
inconsistencies between the two approaches. The differences between
Molien and Dillon regarding the physical injury and sensory perception
requirements remain unresolved.
D.

The Ochoa Decision: Consistency or Conflict

In addition to leaving conflicting case precedent unresolved, the
Ochoa decision is internally inconsistent. One of the greatest concerns
with the Dillon standards was that they are sometimes used arbitrarily,
creating confusion and artificiality.132 The Ochoa majority, after voicing
this concern, appears to use these guidelines in exactly this manner. The
court allowed the father to recover only for his distress from observing
his son, and not for his distress from hearing his wife's reports.133 The
distress the father suffered from his wife's reports was no less real or
m

ltL at 172-73, 703 P.2d at 10, 216 CaJ. Rptr. at 670.
See id. at 182, 703 P.2d at 17, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting)*
"VdL at 165 n.6, 703 P.2d at 5 n.6, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665 n.6.
%K
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foreseeable than the distress he suffered from witnessing the child*!
condition himself. Thus, the court made an artificial distinction basec
on the source of the mental distress. This distinction was based upor
the Dillon requirement that the shock be from a direct emotional impaci
caused by a sensory and contemporaneous observation. However, th(
court used the guideline in an artificial manner — not to limit the
defendant's liability where it is not warranted, but rather to distinguish
between compensable and non-compensable portions of the same injury
Another question that arises is the court's use of "serious" mental
distress. The majority stated that it would compensate the parents onl)
for their distress resulting from the suffering they witnessed and not foi
the death of their child, which they did not observe.134 If the child had
not died, the Ochoas' distress probably would not have been senom
enough to warrant recovery. A relative of a person who recovers despite
medical inattention for two days would probably not suffer "serious
mental distress."133 Therefore, in reality, the court did one of two things.
It either discarded the seriousness requirement of mental distress or il
compensated the plaintiffs for their son's death. Actually, the court
probably allowed recovery for distress suffered from the victim's unobserved death. This result directly conflicts with the Dillon requirement
that observation is the basis for recovery and contradicts the court's
reasoning for not allowing the father a full recovery.
E.

The Ochoa Case as Precedent

Ochoa will have substantial and far-reaching effects as precedent
for mental distress cases. First, Ochoa poses serious problems of application for future mental distress cases in Dillon jurisdictions. Second,
Ochoa will deepen the division of opinion as to which is the most
rational approach to mental distress claims.
Ochoa's immediate effects within Dillon jurisdictions will be twofold. First and most obviously, the case furthers the confusion and
conflict in the case precedent. Thus, mental distress cases are likely to
remain in a state of conflict for the present.
More importantly, Ochoa may have serious repercussions in the area
of medical malpractice. Ochoa allowed recovery for mental distress caused
by witnessing a loved one suffer from a doctor's negligence. Therefore,

tu

See id. at 167 n.7, 703 P.2d at 6 n.7, 216 CaJ. Rptr. at 666 n.7.
"The courts have repeatedly emphasized that a "serious" mental disturbance requires
more than being upset or having hurt feelings. A senous injury is one that is debilitatuig.
Seet e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 78, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983). It *
reasonable to assume that a "reasonable person normally constituted" would be able to
endure some anxiety over a relative's bnef suy in the hospital, without suffenng debilitatuig
mental injuries.
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a claim for a bystander's mental distress for medical malpractice against
another is now recognized. The addition of another cause of action in
the medical malpraaice area will increase the scope of damages that
may be recovered. Considering the problems that large recoveries against
the medical profession have raised, increasing the scope of damages may
have negative consequences.136
Furthermore, Ochoa will strengthen the arguments of those opposed
to the Dillon approach. Dillon critics fear the possibility of unlimited
liability for mental distress.137 Adding medical malpractice to the scope
of mental distress recovery is a large step in the extension of liability.
Critics may fear that once this step has been taken, there will be no
principled basis on which to limit liability.138
Ochoa may also be used to further the argument that the Dillon
standards are too mechanical.139 Other courts are unlikely to adopt the
Dillon approach unless it can be proven that its rules of liability are
sufficiently generalizable to be applied with reasonable certainty to comparable factual situations.'40 Ochoa illustrates that such reasonable certainty of application has not been achieved. Therefore, Ochoa may serve
as ammunition for jurisdictions that decline to adopt the Dillon foreseeability test.
IV.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION: A FLEXIBLE STANDARD
OF DUTY AND HIGHER BURDEN OF PROOF

Obviously, none of the alternatives to the negligent infliction of
emotional distress is without fault. A rational approach to the problem
would be to consider the most important objectives to be attained and
tailor the solution to meet those objectives.
Most, if not all, of the arguments proposed in favor of the various
theories support one of two overriding policies. The first is that any

'"Increasing medical malpraaice awards will raise the already skyrocketing costs of
medical malpraaice insurance. Such costs are passed on to consumers, who pay higher
medical bills. Peterson & Priest, The Civil Jury 34 (Rand Corp. Doc. No. R 2881-1CJ,
1982). In some areas of practice, the high cost of insurance or its unavailability has caused
a scarcity of doctors. Id.
•"Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 660-61, 406 A.2d 300, 309 (1979) (Grimes, J.,
dissenting) ("Accidents are often caused not by reprehensible conduct, but by momentary
inadvertence or judgment which after the faa is found to have been faulty . . . . [TJhe
court's new rule can cause the dominoes to start falling subjecting the person to suits
. . . by all manner of relatives whose 'mental tranquility' is claimed to have been upset
. . . . (TJhe genie is now clearly out of the bottle . . . .")
,m
Eg.p id.
l
»See, e.g., Ochoa. 39 Cat. 3d at 182, 703 P 2d at 17, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird,
C.J., concurring and dissenting).
"See D'Ambra v. United States. 114 R.I. 643, 664. 338 A.2d 524, 536 (1975) (Josiin,
/.. dissenting).
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rule imposing liability must not be arbitrary or capricious, yet must be
flexible and broad enough to be applied to various factual situations
with reasonable certainty.'4' The second goal is an equitable method of
avoiding unwarranted liability without unduly restricting recovery where
deserved.142
A flexible standard of liability, coupled with an increased burden
of proof, would be the most effective approach to the negligent infliction
of mental distress. By leaving the substantive law flexible to meet unpredictable factual situations and increasing the burden of proof to
eliminate unwarranted liability, most of the criticisms to the various
approaches to mental distress can be overcome.
Flexible liability standards require flexible duty standards because
duty is the key to liability in negligence actions.143 A flexible standard
of duty is one that is based upon foreseeabilityJ44 Foreseeability as the
basis of duty would allow flexibility of recovery without the use of
mechanistic or rigid rules.'45 Foreseeability can be a general principle
applicable to a variety of factual situations.146
In order to avoid problems with the interpretation of what must be
foreseeable, the Dillon standards may be generalized on a simple level.
The Dillon guidelines require that the plaintiff be a close friend or
relative who was near the scene of the accident and who witnessed the
accident.147 These guidelines may be generalized to the concept that the
plaintiff and the mental injury be foreseeable. The plaintiff must prove
that the defendant could reasonably expect this injury to occur to this
person, given the circumstances of the case. In other words, liability
should be imposed if the defendant could reasonably foresee this type
of liability as a result of his actions.
This approach to liability has many positive aspects. The concept
of duty in mental distress cases will conform to other areas of negligence.148 A flexible approach to duty avoids the criticisms that plague
the impact rule and zone of danger rule because the foreseeability
approach is a general principle that avoids mechanistic rules. Liability
should be imposed if the plaintiff and his injury were foreseeable.
The greatest disadvantage of a flexible standard of duty is the fear
of unlimited liability, fraud, and lack of proof of injury and causation.

"'See, e.g., Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980); D'Ambra, 114 R.I.
at 664, 338 A.2d at 536 (Joslin, J., dissenting).
":See, e.g., Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728. 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72.
'"See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 356.
'"See supra note 66 and accompanying lext.
'"See Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 191, 703 P.2d at 23. 216 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J..
concurring and dissenting).
"Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
"See Leong v. Takasaku 55 Hawaii 398. 407, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (1974).
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AH three of these concerns may be eliminated by raising the burden of
proof to that of "clear and convincing evidence."
In a civil trial, the normal burden of proof is a preponderance of
the evidence.149 This standard serves three functions. First, the low burden
allows dispute resolution with reasonable dispatch and finality.150 Second,
there is no substantial reason to burden one party greatly.151 Finally,
the burden of proof deters frivolous actions only in cases where the
evidence is in equipoise.152
Raising the burden of proof to that of "clear and convincing
evidence"153 would dispose of any criticisms of a flexible-duty approach
and promote the goal of limiting unwarranted liability. Furthermore, an
increased burden of proof in mental distress claims would be consistent
with the rationales for imposing a lower burden in most civil cases.
Finally, an increase in the burden of proof would be consistent with
case law where the state of mind is the factual issue to be proven.154
A standard of clear and convincing evidence should erase most of
the criticisms surrounding the flexible duty approach. To dispel the fear
of unsubstantiated claims of mental distress, this burden would force
the plaintiff to bring forth substantial evidence that he had, in fact,
been seriously injured and that such injury was caused, in fact, by the
defendant's negligent conduct.155 A higher burden of proof would allow
recovery in those cases where it is most deserved and inhibit litigation
of claims that are less well-founded.
An increased burden would also tend to deter frivolous mental distress
claims. For example, a plaintiff who witnessed the traumatic death of
a loved one would probably be able to convince the jury that he had,
in fact, suffered injury, given an appropriate amount of medical evidence.
A plaintiff who suffered a mental injury because of property damage,
however, would not be able to meet the burden so easily. Such a plaintiff
would find the jury more skeptical of his claim. Furthermore, this plaintiff
would have a great deal more trouble producing the required quantum
of medical evidence. The plaintiff who indeed suffered a devastating

-MCCORMICK, O N EVIDENCE § 339 (3d ed. E.W. Cleary 1972).

"•Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Non Persuasion, 5 LAW & Soc. REV. 335, 336
(1975).
m
l<L at 337.
"The standard of clear and convincing evidence has been defined as "that measure
or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fart a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." This is an intermediate
standard, falling between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and
the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings. State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d
569, 570 (Tex. 1979).
m
See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
'"A lack of proof regarding both injury and causation was a rationale supporting
the impact rule. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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injury from an unusual source, however, would not be automatically
precluded from asserting his claim. He would still have an opportunity
to put forth evidence that the injury did occur and to let the jury weigh
the evidence in view of the burden he must carry.
Increasing the burden of proof would also be consistent with the
rationales for maintaining a lower burden in most civil cases. An increase
in the burden will not materially slow the litigation process.156 The change
would only force the plaintiff to produce a greater quantum of convincing
evidence.137
However, the most important reason for increasing the burden of
proof in mental distress cases is that mental injury is peculiarly within
the knowledge of the plaintiff. This fact puts the defendant at a substantial evidentiary disadvantage. Courts have feared compensating for
mental distress because of the potential for fraudulent claims.158 The
burden of proof is often raised when there is a special danger of
deception.139 Therefore, there is a substantial reason for burdening one
party more than the other.
Finally, there is a real need to deter frivolous actions in cases where
the evidence appears on the surface to be just beyond equipoise.160 The
potential for fraud and deception in mental distress cases is an everpresent factor.,61 Therefore, all but the most convincing cases of mental
distress should be deterred.
A standard of clear and convincing evidence in mental distress cases
would conform to the burden of proof used in many civil cases where
the issue to be proved is one's state of mind. For example, malice must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence.162 More importantly, mental
illness must usually be proved by clear and convincing evidence.163 While
this issue normally arises in litigation surrounding commitment proceedings, the rationale applies as well to claims of mental distress. If
the issue to be proven is objective, the burden of a preponderance of
the evidence may be used. If such a determination is subjective, however,
a standard of clear and convincing evidence must be met.164 Because
mental illness is not objective, it stands to reason that it should be subject

**See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
"Addington, 588 S.W.2d at 570.
»*£.$., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 519, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (1978).
'"See MCCORMICK, supra note 149, at § 340.
""See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
- S e e Towns, 195 Colo, at 519, 579 P.2d at 1164.
IW
£*., DiLeo v. Koltnow, 200 Colo. 119, 613 P.2d 318 (1980).
,w
£.*. f In re Johnston, 118 111. App. 3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840 (1983); Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 60 Or. App. 623, 654 P.2d 1121 (1982).
'-See, e.g., Maine Human Rights ComnVn v. City of Auburn, 425 A.2d 990, 997
(Me. 1981) (question of intentional sex discrimination in hiring practices).
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to a higher burden of proof. Therefore, an increased burden of proof
for mental distress cases would be both appropriate and in accordance
with analogous case law.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the modern trend of legal thought favors more expansive
approaches to liability for mental distress, many problems with the Dillon
and pure foreseeability tests are still unresolved. Ochoa is a prime example
of the conflict and confusion that have evolved from the application
of Dillon to factually dissimilar situations. The Ochoa court ignored the
conflicts in prior case law and concentrated on one specific factual
scenario. It left a host of unanswered questions about the application
of the Dillon guidelines and the future viability of the Dillon mental
distress theory.
By combining a general foreseeability test for duty with a burden
of proof of "clear and convincing" evidence, the two goals of flexibility
and limiting unwarranted liability may be attained. Such an approach
will overcome many of the criticisms of the more expansive approaches
and avoid the problems associated with an Ochoa situation.
NANA QUAY-SMITH
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Decedent's Heirs Under the Utah
Wrongful Death Act
The Utah Wrongful Death Act1 was intended to provide just
compensation to that class of persons most likely to be injured by
the wrongful act or neglect of another that causes the death of the
decedent.3 The legislature, in this regard, has statutorily granted on
behalf of the decedent's heirs a cause of action against the wrongdoer.1 The legislature, however, by granting the decedent's heirs a
cause of action without defining the scope of that term, has burdened the courts with the duty to define it judicially. Although the
Utah Supreme Court has had several occasions to apply the Wrongful Death Act, it has never specifically defined how broadly or narrowly heirs is to be construed.
Thefirstpart of this Note, in an effort to determine the scope
of protection provided in the Wrongful Death Act, focuses on the
statutory sources for a definition of heirs based on the remedial
policy of the Act, the applicable portions of the Probate Code definition of heirs, and the equities involved. Next, the possibility of
expanding the definition of heirs beyond the Probate Code's statutory definition to accommodate the constitutional requirement of
aqual protection and the judicial doctrine of equitable adoption is
explored. Finally, the Note suggests possible statutory expansions
of protection either by legislative amendment or by judicial recognition of a common law right to recover for wrongful death.
U UTAH CODE ANN. 3§ 78-11-6, -7 (1977). The Utah Wrongful Death Act is in two
Mttrana: $ 6 deals with the wrongful death of a minor child, § 7 covers other wrongful death
trtiooa.
2. The Wrongful Death Act attempts to compensate the heirs for their own loss, not to
ctunptoiats for the injury caused to the deceased. See Mason v. Union Pac. Ry., 7 Utah 77,
81, 24 P. 796, 797 (1890). Any cause of action the decedent himself might have had against
tbs tortfeasor also survives to his heirs under UTAH CODS ANN. § 784142 (1977).
3. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-7 (1977) states:
Except as provided in chapter 1, of Title 35 [Workmen's Compensation Act), when
U» death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another,
hu hem, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an
action for damages against the person causing the death, or, if such person is employed
by aaothsr person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other
pt«oD. If such adult person has a guardian at the time of his death, only one action
csa be maintained for the injury to or death of such person, and such action may be
bfoofhi by either the personal representatives of such adult deceased person, for the
****fit of hit heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of the heirs as provided in the
owl preceding section J78-11-6], In every action under this and the next preceding
*ctjon (78-11-6] such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the
*** aty bt jut*, (emphasis added)
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